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This is an exploration of two moral-political accounts in my search to establish and 
frame better treatment of refugees. When regarding refugees as human beings whose 
lives lack sustainable levels of political, economic, and social stability, both of the 
frameworks I look at stress the importance of providing such persons with succor and 
alleviation. Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach posits the human body as a 
bearer of elemental rights that ought to be recognized and realized. Judith Butler 
presents an argument that focuses on life’s precariousness and grievability. Situating 
the refugee in a normative context will, I think, strengthen the foundation needed for a 
focus on determining what sorts of actions should be taken to rectify the situations of 
increasingly protracted refugee populations which, arguably, consist of the world’s 
most vulnerable political beings.  
 
The definition of who can be called a refugee is disputed, but the most widely-accepted 
definitional parameters are provided by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR). UNHCR frames the refugee as an individual who, “owing to a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular group or political opinion,” has been involuntarily displaced from her country 
of origin or the place that she might consider “home.” The limiting scope of this 
definition, however, affects when, why and how intervention is considered; it can 
exclude individuals who, as involuntarily displaced persons, ought to be considered 
refugees. Because of this, I think we need a broader definition of the refugee, and for 
this project I am introducing one that includes internally displaced persons, stateless 
persons, and persons displaced by natural disasters. My definition also includes persons 
oftentimes referred to as “economic migrants” whose mobilization-inducing poverty 
can be considered a form of coercive displacement, effectively created by failures of 
their nation-state’s and immediate community’s social and political institutions.  
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While examining accounts from Martha Nussbaum and Judith Butler, I argue that the 
perilous conditions experienced by refugees impart a common responsibility to recast 
conceptions of protection and the political in relation to refugees. I aim to determine 
whether we should work to alter the circumstances of refugees, and what sorts of 
strategies adequately take into account the multi-faceted and dynamic circumstances 
that carve out the space of the refugee as a forcibly displaced figure.   
 
Nussbaum considers humans innately political beings who “exert a moral claim that 
(they) should be developed,” and advocates a “capabilities-oriented” approach that 
begins with a consideration of “the human being as a dignified free being who shapes 
his or her own life, rather than being passively shaped or pushed around by the world.”1
 
 
Nussbaum’s framework defends a universal obligation to protect human beings by 
providing social infrastructures that allows the flourishing of their capabilities. The 
capability to shape one’s own life is, according to Nussbaum, what makes human 
nature distinctive; our “humanness” depends upon our ability to access the means to 
realize specifically human capabilities. For Nussbaum, the recognition of both inherent 
and realizable capabilities in another person is the point when an obligation arises to 
help her realize her capabilities.  
Butler defends an account of social ontology and of the vulnerable body as a foundation 
for ethicality and normativity. For Butler, ontology is contingent for all life and based 
in the generalized conditions of “precariousness” and “grievability.” Butler describes 
precariousness as an inescapable and basically universal condition, regardless of one’s 
perceived disengagement from (or, conversely, seeming susceptibility to) the more 
precarious facets of existence. She refers to bodies whose precariousness is maximized 
on the political front as being in states of “precarity” where precariousness has been 
differentially allocated for the bodies in question.2
 
 According to Butler, the motivation 
to aid involves both apprehension and recognition of the differentially allocated 
precariousness of others.  
Without a meticulous framework that denotes human life with a certain worth—in the 
case of Nussbaum, because of the human’s teleology, found in her inherent and 
potential capabilities; in the case of Butler, because of the inherent value we should 
extrapolate from the extensive interdependency and precariousness of all life, and the 
grievability accorded a life “worth living”—it becomes much more difficult to proceed 
with a coherent justification for action. Thus, a moral-political account of the scope of 
both Nussbaum and Butler’s proposals, is, I think, necessary to explicate the 
obligation—humanitarian or otherwise—to alleviate the perilous situations of the 
world’s refugees. However, as I will demonstrate, the mechanism that a moral-political 
account works through is just as crucial, and an account that places too much stock in 
state-centrism and existing sociopolitical institutions within the society of nation-states 
cannot sufficiently address the singularly difficult and complex situations of refugees. 
The circumstances of the refugee involve exclusion, or oftentimes persecution by the 
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community or state she would traditionally look to for her protection and opportunity to 
flourish. Sometimes she is unable to access adequate resources, and thus impelled to 
seek new haven. In order to adequately address these difficulties, there must be a 
cognizance of these particular singularities in the account. To answer questions about 
how and why refugees are treated the way they are, the lack in egalitarianism of 
refugees’ treatment must be highlighted and explained. I find that this is a lack in 
Nussbaum’s account that Butler’s picks up and addresses better.  
 
I. Common Central Capabilities  
 
Nussbaum calls her account of the human functions the “thick, vague theory of the 
good” to convey her theory’s ahistorical universality and cross-cultural flexibility. It 
emerges from 
 
a wide variety of self-understandings of people in many times and places, 
from the stories people tell themselves when they ask what it is to live as a 
being with certain abilities that set it apart from the rest of the living beings 
in the world of nature, and with, on the other hand, certain limits that derive 
from membership in the world of nature.3
 
 
Nussbaum describes the lists of capabilities she details as “open-ended” and 
heterogeneous, containing both “limits against which we press and capabilities through 
which we aspire.”4
 
  
Capabilities operate on two levels, or “thresholds,” the second of which must be 
reached by public policy, personal motivation and social interaction. The first threshold 
involves elements which together compose the “shape of the human life”: mortality, the 
human body, cognitive capability, early infant development, practical reasoning, 
affiliation with other human beings, relatedness to other species and to nature, humor, 
play, and separateness. According to Nussbaum, a life without any of these items would 
be “too lacking, too impoverished to be human at all,”5 so these are necessary 
conditions for a life to be considered human. The central political goal of Nussbaum’s 
framework is that the gap between the presence of these “lower-level” capabilities and 
the potential each human exhibits to fulfill “higher-level” capabilities be filled. “It is 
that gap between humanness and its full realization,” Nussbaum states, “that exerts a 
claim on society and government.”6
 
 
For Nussbaum, then, points of intervention fall between the cognizance of this first 
threshold and the realization of a second threshold “beneath which those characteristic 
functions are available in such a reduced way that, though we may judge the form of 
life a human one, we will not think it a good human life.”7 Nussbaum claims that the 
second threshold, in particular, exhibits the “open-endedness” she describes because “in 
many cases the move from human life to good human life is supplied by the citizen's 
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own powers of choice and self-definition,”8
 
 and insofar as public policy provides the 
opportunity for the threshold of the “good human life” to be met, the actual 
implementation of second-threshold capabilities ultimately remains in the hands of the 
person in question. “Open-endedness” also refers to the malleability of the listed items 
across cultures. Nussbaum puts in these qualifiers to ensure that the capabilities 
approach cannot be criticized for being paternalistic.  
The items Nussbaum lists as elements of the second threshold represent the availability 
of means to activate the capability in question: “the capability to function, not actual 
functioning, should be the goal of legislation and planning.”9 Second-threshold 
capabilities include the abilities to: move from place to place at will; live out a 
“complete” human life, without fear of dying prematurely; have good health; avoid 
unnecessary pain and access pleasure; use all five senses, as well as intellect, 
imagination and reason; have attachment to others, love, and grief; have a conception of 
the good and engage in critical planning about one’s life; engage in different forms of 
social interaction; live with concern for and relation to non-human animals and plants; 
laugh and play, and live one’s own life in a chosen set of surroundings and context.10 
Of these, Nussbaum calls practical reason and affiliation “architectonic”: these 
particular capabilities, Nussbaum argues, “(hold) the whole enterprise together and 
make it human.”11
 
  
Though the provisions of Nussbaum’s approach are wide-ranging and meticulously 
detailed (indeed, well-defended against other normative theories of social ethics and 
public policy12), I want to argue that there is still a limitation to capability theory that 
hinges itself nearly directly on the status of refugees, particularly those fleeing in-state 
violence. Nussbaum clearly states that the capabilities approach requires that the state 
be, in large part, responsible for the implementation and continuation of social 
programs that work to help humans realize their capabilities. In the case of the refugee 
who is forced to flee in-state violence, however, the facilitation of these sorts of 
programs will not be addressed by the refugee’s “home state.” Indeed, the refugee who 
finds herself without a “home” is often driven from it by the very state that Nussbaum’s 
approach claims ought to be one of her closest sources of protection. Now, Nussbaum 
has built provisions into her approach she thinks ecumenical enough to counter this 
limitation. Again, this is why, after creating the lists of capabilities, Nussbaum 
constantly reminds us that the lists are “open-ended”; she makes sure to acknowledge 
the history of prejudicial applications of social justice theories like hers, making 
reference to the “inglorious saga of capability testing”13
 
 in one article. 
Let us see if there is enough leeway to potentially solve the lacuna between the 
capability approach’s close connection to the state and finding a means of facilitating 
proper treatment of refugees. Seemingly, with the adaptability Nussbaum’s approach 
seems to provide, some sort of solution for refugees can be proposed. Can other nation-
states utilize Nussbaum’s lists of capabilities to implicate the state, sovereign body, or 
Res Cogitans (2010) 1                                                                                                        Levinson  | 147 
 
 
2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
social group that disallows even first-threshold capability realization for refugees? Can 
the international juridical realm do the same in circumstances where individual nation-
states fail? Yet Nussbaum’s ideas are already, in varying degrees, implemented at the 
state level and within international law,14
 
 so it seems that something is still missing. As 
an object of political coercion and violence that often stem directly from the nation-
state and its operating bodies, the refugee still lingers in an amorphous no-man’s land 
the capabilities approach is unable to reach. What are the underpinnings of this 
shortcoming? 
On Nussbaum’s account, the “moral concept of the human” drives us toward 
“recognition,” or moral acknowledgment and thus accession to capability-oriented 
rights claims. How, then, are refugees relegated to their statelessness by another 
conscious moral being, or set of conscious moral beings? How are they left languishing 
under the effete jurisdiction of international law, unprotected by the state, banished 
from her birthplace, former residence, and former community? If Nussbaum stands by 
her argument, these questions which pertain specifically to the situations and traumas of 
the refugee cannot be answered adequately by the capabilities approach as I read it. The 
normative ideal Nussbaum purports has not, and perhaps cannot, account for the 
treatment of the stateless, rightless bodies of refugees. We turn now to Butler for an 
account that focuses on the disparaging treatment of ostracized or marginalized political 
figures like refugees. 
 
II. A Social Ontology of Precariousness: The Vulnerable Body as Incentive to Act  
 
Butler states that, as a generalized condition of life, precariousness begins at birth. In 
order to realize the extinguishment of life as a loss, the social nature of ontology 
involves what she calls “apprehending” another life as grievable, and on equivalently 
precarious grounds as one’s own. To apprehend the generalized conditions of 
precariousness and grievability is to notice and identify vulnerability in another, and the 
requirements that must be fulfilled for that other being’s life to be sustained. However, 
on the grounds that “there is no life and no death without a relation to some frame,”15 
Butler seeks to illustrate how, if a life is not apprehended as grievable, it cannot be 
“recognized” in the sense that theorists like Nussbaum argue it can. Michael Kelly 
states that “(if) recognition is one of the basic concepts in liberalism, Butler is 
critiquing liberalism with the concept of apprehension in order to capture the persons 
that liberalism excludes from recognition systemically, not just accidentally.”16
 
 
On Butler’s account, before the sort of recognition Nussbaum aims for can even be 
considered, normalized epistemological “frames” are working to “generate specific 
ontologies of the subject”17 and obscure certain lives from recognition. Here, what 
Butler calls frames are sociocultural norms, “historically articulated and enforced,” that 
determine what lives will or will not be considered grievable and thus livable. On 
Butler’s account, if a life is not apprehended as grievable, it is then not “recognizable” 
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as human, or worthy of being protected. So those who consider the lives of refugees 
ungrievable do not allot them even the first threshold of capabilities Nussbaum 
describes. Certainly, some lives will, in a strong social sense, have “recognizability,” 
but many others will not.  Immigration policies, and the oftentimes brutal treatment of 
immigrants, give us an example of this: a non-citizen is often given a pejorative 
designation, condemned for ulterior motivations, and hardly ever referred to with the 
same concern a citizen is (“How is her health? Are her children doing well in school? 
How has she been doing financially during this difficult recovery period?”). Here, 
frames, or the lenses through which grievable subjects are constituted, are what 
“produce an historically contingent ontology, such that our very capacity to discern and 
name the ‘being’ of the subject is dependent on norms that facilitate that recognition.”18
 
  
Once we understand the functions of recognizability, it follows that those who are not 
characterized by recognizability go unrecognized: during the stage of apprehension that 
Butler argues necessarily precedes recognition, those lives that fall outside the norms 
that frame the recognizable fail to be characterized as grievable lives. Due to this lack 
of grievability, their lives can, and often do, go unacknowledged by surrounding 
communities—they do not count as human. Butler uses the obituary, “the means by 
which a life becomes, or fails to become, a publicly grievable life,”19 as a primary 
example of how public discourse, and the limits of it, “establish the limits of human 
intelligibility.”20
 
  
If we consider one narrative Butler provides of a Palestinian American who submitted 
the obituaries of two Palestinian families to the San Francisco Chronicle, we clearly 
see a paradoxical and prejudicial allocation of grievability, and thus recognizability, 
which prevents the recognition of certain populations. The Chronicle, in response to 
this man’s letter, told him that newspaper policy disallowed the publication of 
obituaries without death certificates. The man resubmitted memorials in the obituaries’ 
stead, only to have his second request for public grieving denied on the grounds that the 
newspaper did not wish to offend its readership. Here, “(in) the silence of the 
newspaper, there was no event, no loss, and this failure…(was) mandated through an 
identification with those who identify with the perpetrators of violence.”21
 
 
Apprehended as ungrievable, precariousness was meted out to these Palestinians 
differentially and in such a way as to deny humanness, and the sort of treatment 
accorded a grievable human life. These were humans whose unrecognizability made it 
possible for them to be denied a basic regard as humans, a regard that those within 
norms of recognizability never think of losing.  
Butler makes a clear distinction between the function of apprehension and the 
achievement of recognition that prompts moral action. Apprehension of another 
precarious life, she repeatedly states, does not guarantee a moral response in the person 
who apprehends. Especially when facilitated by the frames of historically contingent 
norms, apprehension can stimulate behaviors of oppression and violence in the one who 
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apprehends, can give “an insight into the physical vulnerability of others that incites the 
desire to destroy them.”22
 
 The ethical response of guarding the precarious other, then, is 
constantly affected by the norms of recognizability, and by the recreation and 
(de)stabilization of the epistemological frames that shape how we apprehend. Butler 
insists that 
if we are to make broader social and political claims about rights of 
protection and entitlements to persistence and flourishing, we will first have 
to be supported by a new bodily ontology, one that implies the rethinking of 
precariousness, vulnerability, injurability, interdependency, exposure, bodily 
persistence, desire, work and the claims of language, and social belonging.23
 
 
III. The Particular Precariousness of the Refugee 
 
Again, bodies in precarity, on Butler’s definition, are subjected to violence that can 
proceeds directly from a state or operating body that, at the same time, carries on an 
inverse set of relationships with other bodies in their immediate vicinity, associations of 
protection and inclusion. Refugees, then, can be seen as bodies in utmost precarity. 
They are subjected to processes, sometimes state-oriented, “whereby the ontological 
status of (the) targeted population is compromised and suspended.”24
 
 These processes, 
made possible by exploitation of the targeted population, can be seen as following from 
the detrimental type of apprehension mentioned before; in this case, the lives 
apprehended are not designated with grievability. These refugee bodies are  
cast as a threat to human life…rather than as living populations in need of 
protection from illegitimate state violence, famine, or pandemics. 
Consequently, when such lives are lost they are not grievable, since, in the 
twisted logic that rationalizes…the loss of such populations is deemed 
necessary to protect the lives of “the living.”25
 
 
In late modernity, the body of the refugee can be seen as one of the most frequently 
reproduced figures living outside the norms of life.26 The refugee “not only becomes 
the problem to be managed by normativity, but seems to be that which normativity is 
bound to reproduce: it is living, but not a life.”27 If considered undesirable or 
troublesome by a dominant group, she is ousted completely from the frame of normal 
society—perhaps because of her adherence to an unwanted ideology, or because of her 
ethnic background. After fleeing persecution or being forced into exile, she may receive 
temporary shelter from UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations. She still 
remains unwanted, however, on a general political level: she is unable to safely return 
to her former home, and she is hardly ever fully (legally) welcomed into the community 
or state where her makeshift residence is haphazardly constructed. Her rejection is 
considered necessary—for the preservation of the state, for the reinforcement of an 
idealized identity. She is excluded from legal privileges in her asylum country because 
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its leaders feel bound to the principles and protection of national sovereignty and 
citizenship, “received, as it were, on the condition that (she) does not belong to the set 
of juridical obligations and prerogatives that stipulate citizenship or, if at all, only 
differentially and selectively.”28
 
 The case of the economic refugee involves another sort 
of societal exclusion, but very similar results. Thus, even if the refugee’s existence is 
acknowledged by some members of the international community—the U.N., the 
humanitarians, the secondary media—she remains in legal limbo, unable to repatriate, 
or reenter the realm of the real; she cannot regain refuge under the umbrella of the 
sovereign and accepted, of citizenship and community. 
IV. Refocusing on the Refugee 
 
I have shown, through both the structure of the capabilities approach and the criticisms 
of recognition-based theories provided by Butler’s recent writings, that Nussbaum’s 
justifications for the preponderance of the capability approach, in the cases of refugees, 
are insufficient.29 The capabilities approach cannot account for why, if the denial of 
another’s humanness is impossible when the moral categories for recognition are in 
place, certain states and parties still choose to do so by creating refugees whose statuses 
are well-defined as the “fundamental situation of rightlessness.”30
  
 Indeed, the bodily 
status of “refugeeness” has also been described as an “inclusive exclusion,” such that 
the figure of the refugee constantly hovers around the perimeter of frames of 
acceptability and protection, but is never really allowed “in.” Since the capabilities 
approach does rely heavily on state involvement and support to ensure the fulfillment of 
second-level capabilities, Nussbaum’s original manifests falter in the cases of refugees. 
Butler notes that stateless persons “are not just stripped of their status but accorded a 
status and prepared for their dispossession and displacement; they become stateless 
precisely through complying with certain normative categories.”31
 
 If, for example, the 
state is the prejudicial component that has chosen to reconstruct a person or people 
group as undeserving of capability realization, soon-to-be refugees are sized up by the 
state and, upon decision that the lives in question does not meet the first threshold of 
capability, ejected from the coherence of almost all political communities that support 
the creation and sustenance of second-threshold capability. This is quite commonplace 
for nation-states; upon realization of the vulnerability of their normalization and 
dominance, they select a subject or series of subjects that threaten “security” and, 
following this selection, take the steps necessary to minimize the state’s own 
precariousness.  
If Nussbaum’s theory chooses to defer to the jurisdiction of existing international laws 
and norms, then the capabilities approach still falls short: neither the U.N., nor any 
other international agency, has the economic or political capacity to impinge on the 
sovereignty of nation-states that opt out of caring for their citizens in manners that 
conform to the standards of Nussbaum’s capabilities lists. And though Nussbaum does 
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acknowledge the utility of non-governmental, coalitional movements and grassroots 
organizations in her work, her methodology is still missing a component that is very 
important, one that Butler’s account of apprehension clearly invokes and pushes us 
toward: the paramount importance of the language of affect in creating real desires to 
engage in practical forms of helping that follow moral obligation. Altering and 
affecting the circumstances of refugees involves first reconceiving the epistemological 
framing that casts refugees outside of ordinary, recognizable social and political 
frameworks. It is in the stage of apprehension that an ethical exhortation can be 
provided about certain lives that are ordinarily cast as unrecognizable, like those of 
refugees. Nussbaum’s account lacks this stage, precluding forms of social critique and 
sensate democracy that might elucidate cracks in epistemological frames that generally 
render refugee populations unrecognizable.  
 
I am not arguing that the recognition of lives in precarity, which is what Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach starts with, cannot activate claims about the rights of bodies in 
precarity. But Nussbaum’s approach lacks a connection of and continuous 
communication between the stages of apprehension and recognition, and the cases of 
refugees are too dynamic for the framework of the capabilities approach. When 
apprehension of precariousness is coupled with recognition, proactive social agendas 
can found “an alliance focused on opposition to state violence and its capacity to 
produce, exploit, and distribute precarity.”32
 
 An approach to normative inquiry that 
begins with apprehension can be utilized by these alliances to shift the frame of moral 
obligation to a more radical “ought” as we seek to find means of including once-
unrecognizable figures within the norms of recognizability. Finally, when apprehension 
is followed by recognition, it can serve as the bridge from moral conceptions that lack 
adequate inclusion of refugees and their movements. 
When Butler speaks of the “mobile alliances” she envisions, she makes sure it is 
understood that these alliances and coalitions do not settle into liberal or multicultural 
bases, but rather are “bound together less by matters of ‘identity’ or commonly 
accepted terms of recognition than by forms of political opposition to certain state and 
other regulatory policies that effect exclusions, abjections, partially or fully suspended 
citizenship, subordination, debasement, and the like.”33 This work involves “a kind of 
analysis capable of calling into question the framework that silences the question of 
who counts as a ‘who’—in other words, the forcible action of the norm on 
circumscribing a grievable life,”34 so will need to involve shifting mediums that 
counteract the dominant media, ideologies, and frames of normalization that ostracize 
refugees or potential refugee groups. Since Butler emphasizes that by “parsing forms of 
representation” we can apprehend the differential and exclusionary norms that need 
critiquing in the legal-political realm, these alliances will work both with and under the 
level of state-based institutions, but also beyond it, incorporating the resources of 
globalization via sub and supra-national means to build spaces for resistance against 
dominant frames. The varying forms these coalitions can take are not directly outlined 
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by Butler, though she does offer up Muslim LBGTQ groups as examples of how 
coalitions can form over and through “active antagonisms.” “The point,” she stresses, 
“is to insist that normative inquiry take on a critical and comparative form so that it 
does not unwittingly reproduce the internal schisms and blind spots inherent to those 
versions of the subject.”35
 
 Thus, whether these mobile alliances work through non-
governmental organizations, internet forums, or artistic spheres, their role and aim will 
be to shift from normalized focuses that obscure or abuse figures like refugees and reify 
their differential precarity. 
Without us first learning to notice the effects of, perhaps a near-global entrenchment in 
sets of normalized frames that seek to keep refugees expendable, the refugee will 
continue to go unrecognized, and thus, her humanity—her inherent and realizable 
capabilities—will remain unrealized. I think an account like Butler’s that strives to 
reorient political perceptions toward “a consideration of precarity as an existing and 
promising site for coalitional exchange”36
 
 can produce a better, more dynamic 
methodology for refugee rights, one that does not rest on exclusionary maxims, nor 
comes to rest at all. A sensitivity to and an ability to address the particular needs of 
refugees through the affective level is more plausible at the level of “mobile alliances,” 
or non-identitarian coalition-building, than through the nation-state and its related 
institutions. Thus, my practical suggestions, in accordance with Butler, call for this sort 
of coalition-building and movements that seek to create more egalitarian norms of 
recognizability. As I have illustrated, this can entail a varied series of social projects, all 
of which require constant attention, capital, and creative resources in order to remain 
relatable. Because new opportunities continually emerge for coalitional convergence, it 
is through the step of apprehension that I hope to see a refocused set of approaches to 
normative obligation that center on the refugee in the realm of the moral and political 
alike. My hope is that, by learning to use the phase of apprehension to bring recognition 
to refugees, we can find better means of grounding obligation to contemporary refugee 
figures and their crucial, singular needs for consideration and care. 
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